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NOTES

Kalanke v. Freie Hansestadt Bremen:
The Significance of the Kalanke
Decision on Future Positive Action
Programs in the European Union
ABSTRACT

In the landmark case Kalanke v. Freie Hansestadt
Bremen, the European Court of Justice held that a German
state law giving women an "absolute and unconditional
priority" in the labor market was inconsistent with the
European Equal Treatment Directive.
Although many
Europeans vehemently criticized the Kalanke decision
initially, thefuror now appears to have subsided. As a result
of this decision, however, the European Union is currently reexamining equal treatment policies and will likely provide
further guidance to Member States attempting to formulate
positive actionprograms.
This Note first discusses the institutions of the European
Union as they relate to its legal processes. Second, the Note
summarizes the socialpolicy directives on which the holdings
of the European Court of Justice were basec. Finally, this
Note analyzes the significance of the holding with regard to
equal treatment of men and women in the labor market and
addresses the implications of the ruling on future positive
actionprograms in the EuropeanUnion.
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I. INTRODUCTION
On October 17, 1995, the European Court of Justice
(hereinafter ECJ) held in Kalanke v. Freie Hansestadt Bremenl

that a German state law guaranteeing women automatic priority
over men in the labor market was contrary to the European Equal
Treatment Directive 2 that prohibits sex-based discrimination. The
ruling provoked a strong reaction throughout the European
community.
Several Member States and European women's
organizations criticized the ruling as an impediment to women's
progress toward achieving equality in the workplace. 3 To other
Member States and to some members of the European legal
community, however, the decision represented an accurate
interpretation of current European Union (hereinafter EU) law,
which provides that discrimination of any kind shall not be
4
tolerated.

1.
Case C-450/93, Eckhard Kalanke v. Freie Hansestadt Bremen, 1995
E.C.R 1-3051.
2.
Council Directive 76/207/Eec, 1976 O.J. (L 39) 40.
3.
For example, the European Women's Lobby, a coalition of European
national women's groups, announced its disappointment in the ECJ's ruling.
Women Lose Court Fightfor Jobs, Promotions,CAIGaRY HaLD, Oct. 18, 1995, at
A5, availablein LEXIS, News Library, CALHER File.
4.
See Council Directive, supranote 2, at 40.
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Germany is not the only Member State to implement national
measures promoting "positive action," a principle similar to
"affirmative action," designed to eradicate inequalities imposed on
citizens on the basis of race, sex, or ethnicity. Other states, such
as the United Kingdom, Belgium, the Netherlands, and France
have enacted similar programs that provide preferential treatment
toward women.5 In fact, many Member States initiated such
measures because of pressure from the European Commission
(hereinafter Commission). The Commission had asserted that
positive action programs not only promoted equal opportunity,
but also increased public awareness and improved the range of
6
educational and occupational opportunities available to women.
Although the Kalanke decision raises doubts about the future
of such positive action programs, much of the concern appears to

be unjustified.

Although the ruling prohibits positive action

programs that provide automatic preferences on the basis of sex,
measures targeting the means to the result (Le., equal
representation) rather than the result itself may still be
implemented. In fact, the ECJ's decision may be more favorable
toward securing equality for women than initially assumed. The
ruling not only increases Member States' awareness of women's
role in the workplace but also illustrates the deficiencies in the
European Equal Treatment Directive. As a result, the Social
Affairs Council is currently considering an amendment to the
Directive to clarify some of its poorly drafted provisions. 7 A
revision of the current Directive could expand the spectrum of
positive action measures that may be implemented by Member
States and increase the range of opportunities currently afforded
European women.

HI.

HIsToRIcAL PERSPECTIVE

The EU, formerly known as the European Community
(hereinafter EC), 8 is an institutional framework initially created to

5.

See Attie De Jong & Bettina Bock, Positive Action in Organizations

within the European Union, in WOMEN AND THE EUROPEAN LABOUR MARKETS 185

(Anneke van Doome-Huiskes et al. eds., 1995).
6.
Id. at 185. See generally id. at 182-200 (discussing the role of the
Commission in promoting equal opportunities for women and providing examples
of positive action in the Member States).

7.
EU: EU/Socdal Affairs - Major Topical Issues, Agence Europe, Apr. 17,
1997, availablein LEXIS, World Library, TXTLNE File.
8.
In 1991, the Maastricht Treaty renamed the "European Economic
Community" the "European Union." See infra note 29 and accompanying text.
This Note refers to the European Economic Community as the "European
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unite the nations of Europe as an economic entity. The concept
of European unity originated in the post-World War Two recovery
period, during which European leaders were presented with an
opportunity for wide restructuring of Europe's economic and
political institutions.9 World War Two and a succession of prior
wars had plagued and devastated Europe and its peoples.1 0 The
fear of future aggression instilled a desire for peace among the
European nations and initiated a renewed commitment toward
cooperation between previously adversarial nations.1 1
Moreover, the resurgence of Germany's war industries

whose
continued to concern several nations, particularly France,
12

Wary of
historic relationship with Germany had been tenuous.
Germany's potential ability to regain a position of power among
the European nations, the French government proposed the
formation of a European Coal and Steel Community (hereinafter
two essential
ECSC) to regulate the coal and steel industries,
13
elements of economic and military revitalization.

Community" for dates prior to the Maastricht reaty and as the "European Union"
for dates subsequent to the Maastricht Tireaty.
9.

NEILL NUGENT, THE GOVERNMENT AND POLXTICS OF THE EUROPEAN

CoMMUNITY 14-20 (2d ed. 1991). The post-war division of Europe, as well as a
desire for European political and economic cooperation, combined to bring about
fundamental changes in the post-war balance of power. Id. Winston Churchill
pioneered the idea of European unity in his famous Zurich speech in 1946 by
encouraging the construction of a United States of Europe. D. M. HARRISON, THM
ORGANISAION OF EUROPE: THE DEvELOPMENT OF A CONTNENTAL MARIKE

ORDER

6

(1995). In particular, Churchill urged a partnership between France and
Germany, hoping this alliance would provide an impetus for European unity. See
id. at 20. In 1950, German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer further promoted the
concept of European integration by proposing a complete political and economic
union between France and Germany. Id. at 6.
10.
MARK A. KAUFMANN, Mm EUROPEAN COMMUNITY:
TOwARD KNOWING AND UNDERSTANDING THE EC 17 (1993).

See fi
11.
Germany was aware of France's concerns.
12.
Adenauer wrote:

AN ESSENTIAL GUIDE

German Chancellor

The fear persisted in France of being once again attacked by a revived
Germany, and it was conceivable that similar ideas circulated in
Germany. Any rearmament would first involve an increase in production
of coal, iron, and steel. If an organisation as envisaged was created that

would allow the two participating countries to detect the signs of such a
development that new possibility would contribute to an immense sense
of relief in France.
HARRISON, supra note 9, at 7-8 (quoting JEAN MONNET, MEMORES 438 (1976)).
KAUFFMAN, supra note 10, at 37-38. Jean Monnet, a French Foreign
13.
Minister, was the architect and primary supporter of the ECSC. IAL The ECSC
was originally known as the Schuman Declaration, after its author, Robert
Schuman, the French Foreign Minister from 1948 to 1953. Id. See also
HARRISON, supra note 9, at 3. 7.
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In 1951, the ECSC was established by the Treaty of Paris,

14
one of the first major treaties of West European Integration.

France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, and
Luxembourg signed the Treaty of Paris.15 The treaty defined the
four fundamental institutional decision-making bodies of the

ECSC: the Council of Ministers, the High 6Authority, the Court of

Justice, and the Parliamentary Assembly.1
In 1957, the six signatories of the Treaty of Paris
strengthened their relationship by ratifying the Treaty
Establishing the European Economic Community (hereinafter
EEC Treaty). 17 The EEC Treaty, commonly known as the Treaty
of Rome, is considered the foundation of today's EU. Broader in
scope than the Treaty of Paris, the EEC Treaty has been referred
to as the "constitutional charter of a Community based on the
rule of law."' 8 A primary goal of the EEC is the establishment of
a common market. 19 This objective is embodied in the treaty's
preamble, which describes as the treaty's main purpose "to
establish the foundations of an ever-closer union among the
European peoples... [and] by common action [to] eliminate] the
20
barriers which divide Europe."
The EEC Treaty was initially signed by only the six
signatories of the Treaty of Paris. These six founding members
considered the EEC Treaty an instrumental step toward further
economic, social, and political unification of Europe. 2 1
The

14.
See NUGENr, supra note 9, at 35. The ECSC would not have been
established had it not offered to its members the opportunity for both economic
growth and influence In a nascent European Union. Id. at 34-35. France and
Germany particularly benefited from the ECSC. France's fears were assuaged by
Germany's containment, and Germany was presented with an opportunity to

reintegrate Into Western Europe. See id. at 27.
15.
Id. at 35. The Treaty of Paris will expire toward the end of the year
2002. TREATY ESrABUSHING THE EUROPEAN COAL AND STEEL COMMUNnTY, Apr. 18,
1951, art. 97, 261 U.N.T.S. 140 [hereinafter ECSC TREATY].
16.
KAUFFMAN, supra note 10, at 38. Although these four institutions
originated in the Treaty of Paris, the Treaty referred to the European Commission
as the High Authority and the European Parliament as the Common Assembly.
See ECSC TREATY tit. 2, art. 7.
17.
See KAUFFMAN, supranote 10, at 40. In addition to the EEC Treaty, a

parallel treaty was signed in Rome in March 1957, which created the European
Atomic Energy Community [hereinafter Euratom]. See HARRISON, supranote 9, at

32. Euratom was established to further develop the nuclear energy sector. Id.
18.
Case 294/83, Parti Ecologiste 'Les Verts' v. European Parliament,
1986 E.C.R. 1339, 1365.
19.
See KAUFFMAN, supranote 10, at 40. The objectives of the EEC Treaty
include the "Four Freedoms": the free movement of goods, workers, services, and
capital. THOMAS C. FIsCHER, THE EuROPEANIZAT'ION OF AMERICA 46 (1995).
20.
TREATY ESTABLiSHING THE EUROPEAN ECONoMIC COMMUNITY, Mar. 25,
1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11, 14 [hereinafter EEC TREATY].
21.
KAUFFMAN, supranote 10, at 40.
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United Kingdom (hereinafter U.K.), however, did not share these
aspirations; rather, it desired a "looser economic community" and
one without political or social constraints. 2 2 Significantly, the
U.K., one of the strongest and most influential countries in
Europe, was neither a member of the ECSC nor one of the original
signatories of the EEC Treaty.2 3 The U.K.'s refusal to participate
in the ECSC stemmed primarily from an underlying apprehension
that unification would result not only in economic free trade, but
also in social and political integration among the Member
States. 2 4 In 1962, however, cognizant of the EC's economic
success and troubled by its faltering domestic economy and
deteriorating political stature, the U.K. applied for membership In
the Community. 25 The U.K. application was not accepted until
1973, after the resignation of French President Charles de Gaulle,
who had been unwilling to compromise France's prominent

22.
HARRSON, supra note 9, at 33. Although Churchill alluded to the
concept of a United States of Europe in his 1946 Zurich speech, it Is unclear
whether he intended for Britain to be a leader in such an alliance. Conscious of
the precarious nature of Franco-German relations, Churchill recounted in his
memoirs: To me the aim of ending the thousand-year strife between France and
Germany seemed a supreme object . . . . It seemed to me that the
supreme interest of the British people In Europe lay in the assuagement of
the Franco-German feud, and that they had no other interest comparable
or contrary to that. That is still my view today.
Id. (quoting 1 WINSrON CHURCHiLL, TE SECOND WORLD WAR 26 (1965)).
23.
KAUFFMAN, supra note 10, at 41. At the time of the ECSC's formation,

the U.K. was concerned about the expansion of the Soviet Union and wanted to

maintain its independence to ally with the United States If necessary. HARRiSON,
supra note 9, at 21. In a 1955 policy paper, the U.K. enunciated four reasons for
not joining the Community: (1) membership would weaken its ties to the
Commonwealth; (2) European economic integration was contrary to worldwide
free trade; (3) the prospect of economic Integration would eventually incorporate
an unacceptable degree of political integration; and (4) membership would remove
the protection of the U.K. industry against European competition. Id. at 33.
24.
See KAUFFmAN, supra note 10, at 41-42. The U.K. led Denmark,
Austria, Sweden, Switzerland, Norway, and Portugal on May 3, 1960 to form the
European Free Trade Association (hereinafter EFrA), which solely endorsed the
concept of economic integration.
EUROPEAN COwiaIxssION DELEGATION, THE
EUROPEAN UNION AND THE UNITED STATES IN THE 1990's 6 (1996).

Today, EFrA

comprises Austria, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, Finland and
Liechtenstein, all of which have subsequently applied for membership in the EU
except Ireland and Liechtenstein. Id.
25.
See KAUFFMAN, supra note 10, at 45-47. Each of the following events
or situations contributed to the U.K.'s decision to apply for membership in the
EU: the Suez affair; ongoing U.S.-U.S.S.R. bilateral discussions; and the EU's
prospering political and economic status. NUGENr, supranote 9, at 50. Id. at 45.
The Member States of the EU were outperforming the U.K. In several key
economic areas, including growth in trade, investment, and gross national
product. Id. at 51.
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position in the Community. 26 Accompanying the admission of the
U.K. in 1973 were the admissions of Ireland and Denmark, two
countries with strong economic and cultural ties to the U.K. 2 7 In
1981, Greece became the tenth Member State; Spain and Portugal
joined in 1986; and Austria, Finland, and Sweden joined the EU
on January 1, 1995, increasing the membership to fifteen
28
states.
In the slow but steady progress toward complete unification,
European leaders drafted a new treaty in November 1991,
amending the foundational EEC Treaty. 2 9
The Treaty on
European Union (hereinafter TEU) was signed at Maastricht,
Netherlands, on February 7, 1992, and entered into force on
November 1, 1993.30
It renamed the "European Economic
Community" the "European Union."3 1 The TEU, commonly
known as the Maastricht Treaty, notably instituted a detailed
timetable toward the completion of an Economic and Monetary
Union, which included the creation of a common currency. It also
provided provisions for implementing a Common Foreign and
Security Policy (hereinafter CFSP) and a Justice and Home Affairs

Policy. 32

Moreover, the Maastricht Treaty affirmed the EU

commitment to integration by requiring a review of the Maastricht
Treaty at the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference.3 3
The
Maastricht Treaty augmented but did not supersede the EEC

26.
NUGENr, supranote 9, at 50. De Gaulle vetoed the membership of the
U.K. both in 1961 and 1967. Id. Several reasons have been cited for De Gaulle's

reluctance to admit the U.K. into the Community. De Gaulle not only feared that
the U.K. would preempt France's prominent role there but also that the U.K
would attempt to overturn the recently established alliance between France and
Germany. Id. Moreover, De Gaulle was suspicious of the U.K.'s ties to the United
States and was wary of U.S. involvement in European affairs. See id.
27.
Id. at 51. When the U.K. applied for membership both in 1961 and
1967, Ireland, Denmark, and Norway attached their own applications to the
U.K.'s application. Id. In 1973, Norway again applied for membership but was

forced to revoke its application after 53% of the Norwegian voting population

rejected Norway's membership. KAUFFMAN, supranote 10, at 47.
28.
EUROPEAN COMMIssION DELEGAmON, supranote 24, at 6.
29.

See generally TREAaY ON EUROPEAN UNION, Feb. 7, 1992, O.J. (C 224) 1

(1992) [hereinafter MAASTRiCHTTREATY].
30.
Id.
31.

Id. tit 1, art. A.

Sari K. M. Laitinen-Rawana, Creatinga UniLed Europe:Maasbicht and
Beyond, 28 INT'L LAW. 973 (1994). These provisions are referred to as the three
32.

pillars of the European Union: (1) a common currency; (2) a common foreign and

security policy; and (3) a common justice and internal policy. George Soros, Can
Europe Work?: A Plan to Rescue the Union, Fop- AFF., Sept./Oct. 1996, at 8. In

addition, the Maastricht Treaty addressed the possibility of expanding the EU to
include qualifylng eastern European nations. Id.
33.
See generally MAASrCHTTREArY tit. VII. arts. 110-11.
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Treaty, which remained the primary governing document of the
EU.3 4

Ill. THE PRIMARY INSTITUIONS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

The EEC Treaty defines and empowers the four institutional
decision-making bodies of the EU:

the European Commission,

the Council of the European Union, the European Parliament,
and the European Court of Justice.3

5

Based on partnership and

cooperation, the substantial interaction among these four primary
institutions
restricts
the
potential
for
domination
36
subordination of any one interest or Member State.

or

A. The EuropeanCommission
The European Commission is the heart and principal
decision-making body of the EU. The Commission is empowered

with initiating legislative proposals, implementing EU legislation,
ensuring compliance of treaty provisions and EU policies by
37
Member States, and managing international trade relationships.
The
current
Commission
(1995-2000)
comprises
twenty

Commissioners 38 who act in an executive capacity over their
institutional counterparts. 3 9
Although Commissioners are
appointed by their representative governments, they are obliged to
act independently and only in the interests of the EU. Thus,

while in theory the Commission is deemed an impartial body, it is
not entirely apolitical, due to the nature of appointments. 40

In

34.
See FISCHER, supra note 19, at 22; see generally Laitinen-Rawana,
supranote 32 (describing the Maastricht Treaty and its basic principles).
35.
See generally EEC TREATY arts. 137-92.
36.
KAUFFMAN, supra note 10, at 55.
37.
See Ellie Roelofs, The European Equal Opportunities Policy, in WOMEN
AND THE EUROPEAN LABOUR MARKEqS, supranote 5, at 122, 126.
38.
EUROPEAN COMMISSION DELEGAnoN, supra note 24, at 11. The 20
Commissioners include the President of the Commission, who is elected by the
Commissioners for a two-year term. JULT LODGE, THE EUROPEAN COMMuNITY AND
THE CHALLENGE OF THE FUrURE 7 (1993). In practice, however, this term is often
renewed to more closely parallel the five-year term of the Commissioners. Id.
39.
Id. The larger Member States (France, Italy, Germany, Spain, and the
U.K.) each elect two Commissioners, while the smaller Member States only elect
one. Id. at 6.
40.
See kd. at 7. The political nature of the Commissioners' appointments
is Illustrated by U.K. Prime Minister Thatcher's refusal to nominate Lord Cockfleld
for a second term due to his deviance from her policies regarding the Internal
market. Id.

POSITIVE ACTION PROGRAMS IN TEE EU
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fact, Commissioners often compete for portfolios pertaining to
41
domestic issues of their respective nations.
In addition, the Commission is assisted by an extensive
bureaucracy that is subdivided into directorates-general
(hereinafter DGs). Each of the more than twenty-five DG sections
is responsible for a separate policy area, such as External
Relations, Agriculture, and Energy. 4 2
The DGs are the
Community's civil service and supply Commissioners with the
expertise necessary for wise decision-making in their respective

policy areas.

43

B. The Council of the EuropeanUnion
The Council of the European Union (hereinafter Council),
commonly known as the Council of Ministers, consists of one
representative from each Member State.4 4 The Council meets at
least twice a year, toward the end of each Member State's sixmonth presidency. 45 It is responsible for voting on legislative
proposals submitted by the Commission, setting political
objectives, coordinating national policies,
and promoting
intergovernmental cooperation. 46 Unlike members of the other
institutions, members of the Council are not permanent
representatives. 4 7 Instead, different ministers attend Council

41.
Id. at 8. The President of the Commission distributes the portfolios to
the representatives of the Member States. Id. In this respect, Member States vie
for presidential favor. Traditionally, however, the Big Four (France, Germany.
Italy, and the U.K.) are given preference over the other Member States. Id.
42.
IdA at 6.
43.

KAUFFMAN, supranote 10, at 67.

44.

See EEC TREATY art. 146.

The Council is

composed of either a

president or a high ranking minister from each state. Hon. John P. Flaherty &
Maureen E. Lally-Green, The EuropeanUnion: Where is it Now?, 34 DUQ. L. REV.

923, 934 (1996). The President of the Council changes every six months, rotating
through the Member States in alphabetical order according to their mother
language, i.e. Belgie (Dutch) or Beligique (French), Danmark, Deutschland, Elias
(Hellas), Espana, France, Ireland, Italia, Luxembourg, Nederland, Portugal, and
the U.&. KAUFFMAN, supra note 10, at 64; however, to prevent each country from
always assuming the presidency during the same half of the year, and thus from
controlling the same seasonal agenda, pairs of presidents switch terms until
1998. Ic at 65.
45.
EUROPEAN CoMMIssIoN DELEGATION, supranote 24, at 9.
46.
See generally FISCHER, supra note 19, at 51-54.
47.
KAUFFMAN, supra note 10, at 60. Each Member State, however, does
have a permanent member who resides in Brussels and maintains constant
interaction with the other institutions. These permanent members are often
senior diplomats and constitute the Committee of Permanent Representatives
(hereinafter COREPER). COREPER is responsible for resolving on a ministerial
level many of the most difficult and sensitive issues for providing assistance to the
Council members, and for collaborating with the Commission in preparing and
submitting proposals to the Council. Id. at 62.
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48
meetings according to the issues on the agenda.
Unlike the Commissioners, members of the Council directly

represent their national governments and are authorized to act on
behalf of their Member States. 4 9 Most decisions are made by
qualified majority voting,5 0 while unanimity is required for policy

in areas such as amendments to treaties, taxation, new common
policies, or the admission of new Member States.5 1
This
requirement of unanimity, however, has often resulted in political
gridlock, delaying policy initiatives, particularly those involving
social policies.5 2 To alleviate this problem, the European Council
or "European Summit" was formed in 1974 to act as a final
arbiter when such instances arise. 5 3 The Summit consists of the
heads of state or government of each Member State, who meet at
least twice a year, and has evolved into one of the most powerful
institutions in the Union. 5 4 It is responsible not only for resolving
contentious issues that pose difficulties for the Council of
Ministers, but also for providing political direction and leadership
in the unification process. 5 5
The Council of Ministers enacts legislation primarily through
regulations and directives. 5 6 Article 189 of the EEC Treaty
provides that regulations be directly applicable to all Member
States and immediately binding on all Member States even in the
absence of national legislation.5 7 Usually regulations are specific

48.
Id. at 60. For example, the Ministers of Social Affairs preside over
women's issues; the Ministers of Finance preside over tax Issues. Id.
49.
See Flaherty & Lally-Green, supra note 44, at 960.
50.
Qualified majority voting requires 62 out of a total 87 votes for a
proposal to be adopted. EUROPEAN COMMISSION DELEGATION, supranote 24, at 11.
The number of votes per Council member is determined according to his or her
nation's population. Id. Currently, the U.K, Italy. Germany, and France each
have 10 votes; Spain has eight votes; Belgium, Greece, Netherlands, and Portugal
each have five votes; Austria and Sweden each have four votes; Ireland, Denmark,
and Finland each have three votes; and Luxembourg has two votes. Id.
51.
Id.
52.
See Roelofs, supra note 37, at 125.
53.
FISCHER, supranote 19, at 51-52.
54.
See id.
55.
See Id.
56.
NUGENT, supra note 9, at 170. The Council also enacts legislation by
issuing decisions or recommendations and opinions. See &Lat 170. A decision Is
binding in its entirety to whomever it is addressed, such as any or all Member
States, firms, or individuals. Id. at 171. Examples of decisions include the
institution of a pilot action program, the authorization of grants, or the exemption
of Member States from certain EU provisions. Id. In contrast, recommendations
and opinions are not binding and therefore are not considered a source of legal
authority. Id. See also KAurFMN, supranote 10, at 57.
57.
Article 189 provides the type of legislation each of the institutions may
adopt and expressly states that "[riegulations shall have a general application.
They shall be binding in every respect and directly applicable in each Member
State." EEC TREATY art. 189.
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and narrowly constructed, providing little discretion to Member
States in their implementation.5 8 Directives, on the other hand,
state compulsory objectives that Member States are obliged to
incorporate into their national legislation within a mandatory time
period.5 9 Article 189 describes a directive as binding "as to the
result to be achieved, while leaving to domestic agencies .
[the] form and means."6 0
Directives are less detailed than
regulations and are concerned more with setting forth policy
principles for Member States than with the uniform application of
policy. 6 ' A directive, therefore, merely serves as a foundation on
which Member States must implement the required legislation.
Thus, national governments are afforded some, although limited,
62
participation in the legislative procedure.
To ensure the implementation of directives by each Member
State, the Commission is authorized to institute infringement
procedures against non-compliant Member States.
This
procedure is initiated and effectuated primarily through judicial
action that often continues for several years before national
acquiescence. 63 In addition, directives are particularly significant
in the context of equal opportunities because legislation in this
64
area is enacted primarily in the form of directives.
C. The EuropeanParliament
The European Parliament is directly elected by the citizens of

all Member States and is therefore the true democratic voice of
the peoples of Europe. 65

The Parliament is viewed as the

guardian of European interests and is responsible for responding
to the complaints of European citizens who have a right of
petition to the Parliament.6 6 Elected every five years, Parliament
members total 626 and are organized by political party rather

58.

59.

See FISCHER, supranote 19, at 73.
See NuGET, supra note 9, at 169; see also KAuFFMAN, supra note 10, at

57.
60.
EEC TREAY art. 189. Article 100 provides that directives require
unanimous adoption by the Council of Ministers. EEC TREAay art. 100.
61.

NUGENT, supranote 9, at 169.

62.
FISCHER, supra note 19, at 74.
Through a process called
"transposition," Member States transpose EU law into national law. Id.
63.
See Tineke van Vleuten, Legal Insbuments at the EU Level in WOMEN
AND THE EUROPEAN LABOuR MARKETS, supra note 5. at 143, 145.
64.
See EVELYN ELus, EUROPEAN CoMMITYun SEx EQuATY LAW 5 (1991).
65.
See Roelofs, supranote 37, at 126.

66.
Laitinen-Rawana, supranote 32, at 991. The Parliament also appoints
an Ombudsman, who is responsible for investigating complaints received by
citizens. Id.
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than by nationality.6 7 Each Member State's
population roughly
68
determines its number of representatives.
Although the Parliament primarily serves as a supervisor and
political advisor to the other EU institutions, its responsibilities
have been expanded by subsequent treaties since its origination
in the Treaty of Paris.6 9 The Parliament is currently a codecisionmaker with the Council in several policy areas, including
free movement of workers, education, health, and, most
importantly, the budget, which it can amend or reject. 70 In
addition, the Parliament has "consultation powers," requiring it to
submit to the Commission an opinion on all legislative proposals
before the Council adopts them. 7 1 The Parliament is further
granted "cooperation powers" that allow It to amend Commission
proposals in a number of areas, such as the environment,
72
research, and overseas development.
Moreover, the Parliament maintains considerable influence in
its supervisory capacity not only by addressing and raising
awareness of current issues but also by questioning proposals
submitted by the Commission. In particular, the Parliament has
indicated its interest in equal opportunities policy through the
73
creation of a parliamentary committee on the rights of women.
This committee investigates the impact of EU policies on women
and presents its findings to the other institutions. 74

67.

EUROPEAN COMMISSION DELEGATION, supra note 24, at 9.

Due to the

organization of the Parliament, Parliament members often act according to their
political and party interests rather than their national interests. Flaherty &LallyGreen, supra note 44, at 934.
68.
KAUFFMAN, supranote 10. at 72.
69.
Id. at 71-78. In particular, the Single European Act (hereinafter SEA)
and the Maastrlcht Treaty significantly expanded the role of the Parliament by
providing the Parliament with consultation, cooperation, and co-decision powers;
however, Parliament members still contend that a "democratic deficit" (Le. limited
legislative powers) remains. Id. at 75-76.
70.
See Roelofs, supranote 37, at 126.
71.
OFFICE FOR OFFICIAL PUBUCATIONS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES,
SERVING THE EUROPEAN UNION: A CITIZEN'S GUIDE TO THE INSTITTIONS OF THE
EUROPEAN UNION 6 (1996) fhereinafter CITZEN'S GUIDE].
72.
I. See also Laitinen-Rawana, supra note 32, at 980-81 (providing a
general overview of the Parliament's powers).
73.
See Roelofs, supranote 37, at 126.
74.
I. The Parliament has been the primary instigator of social policy
among the EU institutions. Id. In fact, the Parliament requested that the Council
enact legislation pertaining to equal pay for equal work several years before the
adoption of the Equal Pay Directive. Id.
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D. The EuropeanCourtof Justice
The ECJ is composed of fifteen judges, who are assisted by
nine advocates-general. 7 5 All are appointed by mutual agreement
of the Member States for six-year terms. 7 6 Although the judges
consider themselves European judges, at least one judge
represents each Member State. 7 7 The ECJ's decisions are by
78
majority vote, with no published dissenting opinions.
Significantly, debate has recently developed among many Member
States, some of whom believe the judges should have longer terms
79
and be denied reappointment to avoid inherent national bias.
Others have suggested that the judges be allowed to publish
dissenting opinions.8 0
Advocates-general act merely as amicus curiae for the ECJ.
They are required to act with impartiality and independence in
8
making reasoned opinions on cases brought before the ECJ. 1
The advocates-general contribute to the judicial process by
examining the issues in a case, stating the parties' arguments,
providing their own conclusions, and suggesting solutions. These
opinions are similar to separate concurrences or dissents and

often influence future decisions of the ECJ even when not initially

CIzENs' GUIDE, supranote 71, at 18.
76.
EEC TREAiY art. 167. Article 167 of the EEC Treaty states that judges
are to be appointed "from among persons of indisputable independence who
fulfill] the conditions required for the holding of the highest judicial office in their
respective countries or who are jurists of a recognised competence." Id.
75.

77.
See JURGEN SCHWARZE, THE ROLE OF THE EUROPEAN COUiRT OF JUSTICE IN
THE INTERPRErATION OF UNIFORM LAW AMONG THE MEMBER STATES OF THE EUROPEAN

COMMUNITIES 14 (1988). Although the EEC Treaty does not explicitly address the
issue of the nationality of judges or advocates-general, Member States have
sought to maintain an equal representation among the different nationalities. See
David Stoelting, The JurlsdictionalFramework of the European Court of Justice.29
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'LL. 193, 196 (1991).

78.
See HENRY G. SCHERMERES & DENIS F. WAELBROECE, JUDICIAL
PROTECnON INTHE EUROPEAN COMMUNmES 496 (1992). Several reasons have been
posited as to why dissenting opinions are not published: (1) The EU needs
unequivocal rulings to form a strong basis for future development; (2) the absence
of dissenting opinions promotes compromises among the judges, thereby
promoting the assimilation of all the national legal orders into Community law;
and (3) because judges are only appointed for six years, the independence of
judges might be put at risk if their personal viewpoints were published. See id. at
497.
79.
See Ever More ComplicatedUnion, ECONOMIST, Mar. 30, 1996, at 48.
80.
See id.
81.
See SC-WARZE, supra note 77, at 14. Article 166 of the EEC Treaty
provides that, to assist the Court of Justice in its duties, "[t]he duty of the
advocate-general shall be to present publicly, with complete impartiality and
independence, reasoned conclusions on eases submitted to the Court of
Justice.... " EEC TREAiY art. 166.

1100

VANDERBILTJOURWAL OFTRANSNATIONALLAW

IVoL 30:1087

followed by it. 8 2 Although the opinions of the advocates-general
are not binding on the ECJ, they are considered extremely
persuasive. 83 Moreover, the opinions often provide additional
insight into the ECJ's reasoning or its interpretation of a
84
particular case.
In 1989, to assist the ECJ with its increasing caseload, the
Council created the Court of First Instance. 8 5 The Court of First
Instance provides a second tier of judicial authority, allowing the
ECJ additional resources and time for its fundamental task:
ensuring the uniform interpretation of Community law.
The Court of First Instance, comprising twelve judges, has
jurisdiction in disputes between the Community and its staff,
actions brought against the Commission under the ECSC Treaty,
and certain actions regarding competition laws. 8 6 These decisions
are subject to a right of appeal to the Court of Justice on points of
law only. 8 7 An appeal to the ECJ from the Court of First Instance
may be based on one of three grounds: (1) lack of competence of

the Court of First Instance; (2) failure to follow proper procedure;
88
or (3) infringement of EU law by the Court of First Instance.
1. Derivation of Authority
The ECJ performs a dual function in the Community by
ensuring compliance with the economic and social purposes of
the EU and by providing uniform interpretation and application of
EU law. 8 9 It derives its authority from Article 164 of the EEC
Treaty, which assigns to the ECJ the responsibility to "ensure
observance of law and justice in the interpretation and
application of this Treaty.9 0 The ECJ has taken advantage of the
broad scope of responsibility implied by this statement to define
through its own rulings the extent of the authority of EU law and,
consequently, the extent of the ECJ's own authority. 9 1 Even by

82.
See JOXERRAMON BENGOEIXEA, THE LEGAL REASONiNG OF THE EUROPEAN
COURT OF JUSICE 13 (1993).
83.
See JANET DINE Er AL., PROCEDURE AND THE EUROPEAN CoURT 4 (1991).

Advocates-general

opinions may be invoked as persuasive authority in

subsequent cases. See d.

84.

See id.

85.
See Flaherty & Lally-Green, supra note 44, at 965. The Court of First
Instance was established by Article 11 of the SEA. See Single European Act, 1987
O.J. (L 169) 1, 6.

86.
NUGENT, supranote 9, at 189.
87.
See DINE ETAL., supranote 83, at 41.
88.
See 1d. In general, appeals must be brought within two months of the
Court of First Instance's decision. See Ud
89.
See van Vleuten, supranote 63, at 145.
90.

EEC TREATY art. 164.

91.

See SCHwVARzE, supranote 77, at 26.
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the 1960s, the ECJ's rulings brought into existence two
fundamentally inter-related doctrines that have become known as
the "doctrine of direct effect" and the "doctrine of supremacy."
a. The Doctrine of Direct Effect
In 1962, the ECJ in Van Gend en Loos v. Nederlandse
92
Administratie Der Belastingen (hereinafter Van Gend en Loos)
established the doctrine of direct effect, which establishes the
principle that Community law may confer on individuals
enforceable rights that national courts are bound to apply and
enforce. 93 The ECJ held that "the Community constitutes a new
legal order of international law for the benefit of which the states
have limited their sovereign rights, albeit within limited fields,
and the subjects of which comprise not only Member States but
also their nationals."9 4 This principle thus provides individuals
with the rights accorded by Community law in their national
courts and compels national courts to comply with ECJ rulings.
Provisions individuals may directly enforce in national courts

are considered "directly effective" or "directly applicable." 95 As
stipulated by the ECJ in Vand Gend en Loos and clarified by
subsequent case law, a provision must possess four
characteristics to be directly effective. 96 The provision must be
clear, unconditional, non-discretionary, and final, such that
further legislation is not required to render it effective. 9 7 A
92.
Case 26/62, Van Gend en Loos v. Nederlandse Administratie Der
Belastingen, 1963 E.C.R 1. In Van Gend en Loos, the ECJ responded to a Dutch
request for a preliminary ruling regarding whether individuals could rely on treaty
provisions before their national courts. See d. at 6. In particular, the issue
presented to the Court was whether Article 12 of the EEC Treaty had a direct
effect such that it allowed corporations to enforce the provisions of the article In
national courts. See idL
93.
See i. at 12-13; see also NUGENr, supranote 9, at 177.
94.
Vand Gend en Loos, 1963 E.C.R. at 12. The ECJ further contended:
Independently of the legislation of Member States, Community law
therefore not only imposes obligations on Individuals but is also intended
to confer upon them rights which become part of their legal heritage.
These rights arise not only where they are expressly granted by the Treaty,
but also by reason of obligations which the Treaty imposes In a clearly
defined way upon individuals as well as upon the Member States and
upon the institutions of the Community.
Id.
95.
See ELLiS, supra note 64, at 14. International lawyers often use the
phrase "self-executing" to refer to those provisions individuals may directly
enforce in their national courts. Id.
96.
See Id.
97.
Id. See also Case 8/81, Becker v. Finanzamt Mihister-Innenstadt,
1982 E.C.R 53, 70-71 (discussing the effect of directives in general). Today,
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provision is considered "clear" when its terms are not so vague as
to frustrate its application by national courts, allowing national
courts to understand and interpret the legal issues. 98 Provisions
are "unconditional" when they do not depend on further judgment
either by a Community institution or by a Member State. 9 9
Similarly, a "non-discretionary" provision does not leave to a
national court any discretion in implementation. 10 0 Succinctly, a
law has a direct effect if there is "no need for any national
measures to be taken in order for the law to have a binding force
within member states." 10
The determination of whether a
provision has a direct effect is decided by the ECJ and resolved on
a case-by-case basis. 102
According to this definition of direct effect, regulations are
considered directly effective.' 0 3
Directives, however, present

difficulty primarily because they cannot be implemented without
national legislation. It is impractical for individuals to be able to
enforce directives when, by their very definition, they do not
become law until the Member State chooses.' 0 4 The fact that
Member States are allowed to determine when and how to
implement directives, however, does not automatically make
directives incapable of having a direct effect. 10 5 The ECJ has held
directives directly effective if they conform to the four
characteristics denoted above, so that no discretion is left
to the
0 6
national courts in implementing the applicable provision.1
A significant justification for holding directives directly
effective is that Member States are often slow to implement EU
law. Although infringement procedures may be implemented by
the Commission against a defaulting Member State, in practice,
the primary inducements for compliance are political

provisions are often considered directly effective if they are "unconditional and
sufficiently precise." SACHA PREcHAL & NOREEN BuRRows, GENDER DISCRIMINAION
LAW OF THE EUROPEAN Coianurny 28 (1990).
98.
See PRECHAL & BuRRows, supra note 97, at 28.
99.
See id.
100. See ELuS, supra note 64, at 14. See also Joined Cases C-6/90 & C9/90, Francovich v. Italian Republic, 1991 E.C.R. 1-5357, 1-5407-13 (expanding
the EU's ability to enforce directives).
101. NUGENT, supranote 9, at 177.
102. See Gina L. Ziccolella, Comment, Marshall 1H Enhancing The Remedy
Available to IndivrdualsFor GenderDiscririnationIn The EC, 18 FORDHAM II'TL L.J.
641,657 (1994).
103. See ELuS, supranote 64, at 15.
104. See Itd.
105. See PRECHAL & BuRRows, supranote 97, at 29-30.
106. See i. at 30; see also Case 8/81, Becker v. Finanzamt MfinsterInnenstadt, 1982 E.C.R. 53, 71 (stating that whenever a directive appears to be
unconditional and sufficiently precise, the provisions may be relied upon against
any incompatible provision).
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embarrassment and a recognition that the success of the EU
depends on cooperation by all Member States. t0 7 Moreover, the
ECJ has held that once the time limit for implementation of a
directive has elapsed, a Member State may not escape its
obligations to an individual by claiming its own failure to

0
implement the directive.1

8

A distinction is often made between provisions that are
enforceable against a Member State and thus have a "vertical

direct effect," t0 9 and provisions that are enforceable by one
individual against another and thus have a "horizontal direct
effect."" l0 Significantly, directives do not have a horizontal direct
effect."' Although the ECJ in Defrenne v. Begitm 1 2 held that
Article 119 of the EEC Treaty, which addresses equal treatment of
men and women with regard to pay, had a direct effect, the ECJ
denied a horizontal effect to the Equal Treatment Directive." l3 In
Marshallv. Southampton and South West Hampshire Area Health
Authority,1 14 the ECJ held as follows:
[TIhe possibility of relying on the directive before a national court[]
exists only in relation to "each Member state to which it is
addressed." It follows that a directive may not of itself impose
obligations on an individual and that a provision of a directive may
11 5
not be relied upon as such against such a person.

See ELLis, supranote 64, at 16.
107.
108.
See PRECHAL & BuRRows, supra note 97, at 30; Case C-221/88,
European Coal & Steel Community v. Acciaierie e Ferriere Busseni SpA, 1990
E.C.R. 1-495, 1-525 (stating that, where a directive so requires, Member States
have a duty to adopt the specified course of action and may not plead against
individuals the state's failure to perform the obligations set forth in the directive).
109. The ECJ established the principle of "vertical direct effect" in Van Gend

en Loos. See Ziccolella, supranote 102, at 651-52 (stating that for a law to have
vertical direct effect, the provisions must be clear and unconditional and the
individual's claim must be brought against the Member State).
110.
See PRECHAL & BuRRows, supranote 97, at 30.
111.
See Ud
Case 80/70, Defrenne v. Belgium, 1971 E.C.R. 445.
112.
113.
See PRECHAL & BuRRows, supranote 97, at 30.
114. Case 152/84, Marshall v. Southampton & S.W. Hampshire Area
Health Auth., 1986 E.C.R 723. In Marshall,the plaintiff challenged whether a
compulsory retirement age violated Article 5 of the Equal Treatment Directive.
See I. at 743. The plaintiff was an employee of the Health Authority, which
required individuals to retire at the age at which they were able to receive state
pension funds (age 65 for men and age 60 for women). See IU. at 725. The ECJ
held that the policy discriminated on the basis of sex and was therefore contrary
to the Equal Treatment Directive. See id. at 746.
I& at 749.
115.
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The ECJ further noted that although a directive may not impose
obligations on an individual, an individual may rely on a directive
11 6
against a state, whether as an employer or a public authority.
The Marshall decision has been criticized as yielding

contradictory results, however. For example, after this decision, a
state employee may rely on the Equal Treatment Directive in a
discrimination suit against his or her employer, although a
private employee is denied such a right.11 7
The ECJ has
responded to this criticism by stating that this contradiction
could easily be avoided by Member States' correct implementation
of the Directive. 18
b. The Doctrine of Supremacy
The doctrine of supremacy establishes the primacy of
Community law over national law, but curiously is omitted from
the provisions of the EU founding treaties. The principle of
supremacy is crucial to the nature and effective operation of the
EU because it gives precedence to Community law. 119 In the
absence of a uniform legal order, Community law is rendered
futile. 120 Thus the ECJ established this principle in the landmark
cases Costa v. EIVEL and Anministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato
v. Simenthl

S.p.A.

12 1

In Costa v. ENEL, the ECJ stated, "The transfer by the States
from their domestic legal system to the Community legal system
of the rights and obligations arising under the Treaty carries with
it a permanent limitation of their sovereign rights, against which
a subsequent unilateral act incompatible with the concept of the
Community cannot prevail."' 2 2 The ECJ expanded this principle
in Snmenthal by holding Community law superior to national
law, irrespective of whether the national law was effective prior or

116.

See id.

The ECJ specifically held that Article 5(1) of the Equal

Treatment Directive was unconditional and sufficiently precise to be relied on by
an individual against a State and could be applied by national courts. See U. at
750.
117.
118.

See PRECHAL & BuRRows, supra note 97, at 30.
SeeMarshal 1986E.C.R at749.

119. See PREcHAL & BuRRows, supra note 97. at 32. Community law
prevails irrespective of whether the national law was enacted first. See Id.
120.

NUGEr, supra note 9, at 178. In fact, the ECJ stated in Foto-Frost v.

Hauptzolu-ntLdbeck-Ost that "[dlivergences between courts In the Member States
as to the validity of Community acts would be liable to place in jeopardy the very
unity of the Community legal order and detract from the fundamental
requirement of legal certainty."

Case 314/85, Foto-Frost v.

Hauptzollamt

Lfibeck-Ost, 1987 E.C.R. 4199, 4231.
121. Case 106/77, Amministrazione delle Finanze v. Simmenthal S.p.A.,
1978 E.C.R. 629.

122.

Case 6/64, Costa v. ENEL, 1964 E.C.R. 585, 594.
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subsequent to the enactment of Community law. 123 Thus, both
cases establish the exclusive power of the ECJ to interpret
Community law.
The ECJ has articulated several justifications for the
supremacy of Community law. The most significant justification
is simply that Member States limited their sovereignty on
accession into the Union. 124
A similar justification is the
"doctrine of useful effect," which posits that the foundations of the
EU would be undermined if national laws took precedence over
EU law. 125 Moreover, the 1993 Maastricht Treaty states that
Member States are permitted to apply more stringent laws in
areas such as the environment, consumer protection, and social
policy as long as these laws are not contrary to or inconsistent
with EU law. 126 Although some Member States initially resented
the supremacy doctrine, the doctrine has now gained general
acceptance, even if only
out of respect for the success and
12 7
continuation of the EU.
2. Preliminary Rulings
The doctrine of direct effect and the doctrine of supremacy
were developed within the framework of Article 177 of the EEC
Treaty, which ensures uniformity and consistency in the
application of EU law by the national courts. 128 Because EU law
is primarily implemented by national governments, national
courts are often required to interpret and apply EU law. Without
guidance from the ECJ, courts may not always reach similar
conclusions in their interpretation of EU law. Thus, national
courts are empowered under Article 177 to request "preliminary
12 9
rulings" from the ECJ regarding issues of Community law.
This procedure facilitates legal uniformity among the Member

123. The ECJ in Sfmmenthal expanded its supremacy by stating, "Every
national court must, in a case within its jurisdiction, apply Community law in its
entirety and protect rights which the latter confers on individuals and must
accordingly set aside any provision of national law which may conflict with it,
whether prior or subsequent to the Community rule." Slmmenthal, 1978 E.C.R. at
644.

124. See ELLiS, supra note 64, at 9.
125. See id.
126. MAASTRiCHT TREATY tit. XI. art. 129a(1)(3); tit. XVI, art. 130(t); tit. VIII,
art. 118(a)(3).
127. See EIs, supra note 64, at 9. In particular, Italy, France, and West
Germany were initially hesitant to accept such a doctrine. See id. at 9 n.21.
128. See PRECHAL &BURROWS, supra note 97, at 39.
129. See d.
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of EU

law

throughout the Community. 13 0
The ECJ derives its jurisdiction to provide preliminary rulings

on the interpretation of the EEC Treaty and on the validity and
interpretation of secondary Community law from Article 177.131
When such questions arise in a national court, the national court
has the discretion under paragraph 2 of Article 177 to request a
preliminary ruling from the ECJ if it "considers that Its judgment
13 2
depends on a preliminary decision on this question."
Alternatively, the national court may choose to set aside the
national law and apply Community law in conformity with the
doctrine of supremacy.
If such issues are raised before a court of last instance in a
Member State, however, Article 177(c) obliges that court to seek a
preliminary ruling from the ECJ on all relevant issues. 13 3 A court
of last instance is generally the highest court in a Member State
and has been defined by the ECJ as "a national court or tribunal

130. See id. The ECJ stated in Rheftumflhen-Dftsseldorf v. Einfuhr-und
Vorratsstelefur Getreide.
Article 177 is essential for the preservation of the Community character of
the law established by the Treaty and has the object of ensuring that in all
circumstances the law is the same in all States of the Community. Whilst
it thus aims to avoid divergences in the interpretation of Community law
which the national courts have to apply, it likewise tends to ensure this
application by making available to the national judge a means of
eliminating difficulties which may be occasioned by the requirement of
giving Community law its full effect within the framework of the judicial
systems of the Member States.
Case 166/73, Rheinmihlen-Dfisseldorf v.
Elnfuhr-und Vorratsstelle fur
Getreide, 1974 E.C.R. 33, 38. See also Case 283/81, C.I.L.F.I.T. v. Ministry of
Health, 1982 E.C.R. 3415, 3428 ("Article 177 seeks to prevent the occurrence
within the Community of divergences in judicial decisions on questions of
Community law").
131. Article 177 of the EEC Treaty provides:
The Court of Justice shall be competent to make a preliminary
decision concerning:
(a)the interpretation of this Treaty;
(b) the validity and interpretation of acts of the institutions of the
Community; and
(c) the interpretation of the statutes of any bodies set up by an act of
the Council, where such statutes so provide.
EECTaATY art. 177.
132. Id. at art. 177, T 2. See also Carl Otto Lenz & Gerhard Grill, The
PreUrnaryRuling ProcedureAnd The United Kingdom, 19 FoRDHAM INT'L L. J. 844,
846 (1996).
133. See EEC TREATY art. 177, 3; see also PRECHAL & BuRRows, supranote
97, at 39 (stating that the highest court must request the ECJ to provide a
preliminary ruling regarding the validity and meaning of Community Law).
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against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy under
134
national law."
In fact, the courts of last nstance have an obligation to refer
issues of EU law to the ECJ, except in two instances. The first
exception is referred to as acte dclaire and applies when the ECJ
has previously entered a preliminary ruling in a similar case and
therefore has already addressed and interpreted the EU law in
question.' 35 The second exception is referred to as acte clair and
applies when a national court considers the law clear enough to
render an accurate judgment without referral. 13 6 The ECJ
specifically upheld the latter exception in C.I.LF.LT. v. Ministry of
Health,13 7 holding:
[The correct application of Community law may be so obvious as to
leave no scope for any reasonable doubt as to the manner in which
the question raised is to be resolved. Before it comes to the
conclusion that such is the case, the national court or tribunal
courts
must be convinced that the matter is equally obvious to13 the
8
of the other Member states and to the Court of Justice.

The ECJ further noted, however, that conflicting legal traditions
as well as language differences between Member States often
make such conclusions difficult. 139 Thus, while acknowledging
the acte clair doctrine, the ECJ significantly constrained its
140
application.

Although these exceptions may invite abuse from Member
States unwilling to defer judgment to the ECJ, the Commission is
authorized to institute sanctions against Member States for
preliminary ruling. 141 In practice, however,

failure to request a
sanctions are rarely Imposed. 142 Initially, courts rarely requested
preliminary rulings before rendering national judgments (either as

now
a result of ignorance or national pride), but such requests
14 3
constitute a considerable portion of the ECJ's caseload.

134. CJ..L.F.I.T., 1982 E.C.R. at 3428.
135. See C.I.L.F.I.T., 1982 E.C.R at 3429; PRECHAL & BuRROWS, supra note
97, at 39.
136. PREcHAL & BURROWS, supranote 97, at 39; see C.I.LF.I.T., 1982 E.C.R.
at 3429-30.
137. C.LL.F.I.T., 1982 E.C.R. 3415.
138. Id&at 3430. In fact, the ECJ addressed three exceptions in its ruling.
It held that no judicial remedy under national law is required when (1) the issue
is irrelevant; (2) the ECJ has already addressed the question; or (3) the correct
application of Community law is obvious. See kL at 3431.
139. See Ud
140. See DINE ErAL., supra note 83, at 9.
141. The Commission has the authority to implement infringement
proceedings under Article 169. EEC TREATY art. 169.
142. See Lenz & GrilI, supranote 132, at 852.
143. See EL at 847. Approximately 11 preliminary references per year were
Between 1971 and 1980,
ified with the ECJ between 1961 and 1970.
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Preliminary rulings may be requested only by the appropriate
national court or tribunal. 144 Parties are neither afforded the
authority to insist on a reference nor to oppose one that has
already commenced. 1 45
Because parties may not compel a
reference, they often urge the court, implicitly or explicitly, to
make a reference. 146 Thus, parties seeking recourse in the ECJ
may be forced to appeal within their national system on other
grounds until a reference is made to the ECJ by a Member State
court. 1 4 7 Moreover, although the ECJ is required to respond to a

request for a preliminary ruling, it is obliged to rule only on those
issues relevant to the underlying dispute and may not decide the
case on its merits. 148 Any questions referred to the ECJ under
the pretense of a preliminary ruling, but actually requested solely
to challenge a national law's validity, will not be addressed. 149 In
practice, however, the ECJ rarely dismisses cases for lack of a
150
genuine dispute.
Thus, the ECJ interprets EU law only within the context of
the case, without applying extraneous EU law or national law. 15 1
Thereafter, the national court is obliged to apply the law, as
interpreted by the ECJ, on the dispute before it. 1 5 2 Although
generally not binding except on the parties involved in the
particular dispute, the ECJ's decisions indicate how it would rule
in similar cases. 15 3 As a result, the ECJ's decisions are
considered to have an authoritative legal effect. 1 5 4 If the ECJ

approximately 73 preliminary references were filed, and approximately 189
between 1991 and 1994. In 1995, approximately 196 references were flied. Id. at
848.
144. See PRECHAL & BuRRows, supra note 97, at 39.
145. The Court in C.I.L.F.T. noted that "Article 177 does not constitute a
means of redress available to the parties to a case pending before a national court
or tribunal." Case 283/81, C.I.L.F.I.T. v. Ministry of Health, 1982 E.C.R. 3415,
3428.
146.
Carl 0. Lenz, The Roe and Mechanism of the Preliminary Ruling
Procedure,18 FORDHAM IN'LL.J. 388, 394 (1994).
147.
See id.
148.
See Stoelting, supranote 77, at 211.
149.
See Lenz, supra note 146, at 396-97; see also SCHWARZF, supra note
77, at 22.
150. See Lenz, supranote 146, at 397.
151.
PRECIAL & BURROws, supra note 97, at 40.
152.
See van Vleuten, supra note 63, at 145-46. Thus, the ECJ ruling does
not actually decide the case but instead provides direction for national courts.
FISCHE, supranote 19, at 78.
153.
See SCHWARZE, supra note 77, at 31. The ECJ Is not modeled on the
principles of common law, and the common law doctrine of precedent does not
apply to ECJ decisions. Instead, the ECJ Is governed by the principle of res
Judicata,which provides that a judgment Is binding only If there is an Identity of
parties, causes, and subject matter. See id.
154. See L. at 32.
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declares an act or EU law invalid, all Member States should

regard this ruling as applicable throughout the Union.' 55 Thus,

preliminary rulings not only ensure accurate application of
EU
1 56
law but also secure the principles of the supremacy doctrine.
3. Jurisdiction
The ECJ has jurisdiction over two types of cases. The first
are requests for preliminary rulings in cases that both originate
and terminate in a national court. The second are those cases
originating and terminating before the ECJ and requiring an
application of EU law. I5 7 The ECJ has full jurisdiction over the
latter cases, which are considered "direct actions."' 5 8 Direct
actions may be brought before the ECJ in several ways, such as
proceedings for failure of a Member State to fulfill an obligation,
proceedings for the annulment of all or part of a section of
Community legislation, proceedings for failure to act by a
Community institution, actions for damages caused by
Community institutions, and appeals, on points of law
only,
59
against judgments entered by the Court of First Instance.1
IV. EVOLUTION OF SOCIAL POLICY

Article 2 of the EEC Treaty states that the primary objectives
of the European Union are "to promote throughout the
Community, a harmonious development of economic activities, a
continuous and balanced expansion, an increased stability and
an accelerated raising of the standard of living and closer
relations between its Member States." 160 As implied by Article 2,
the process of European integration focuses primarily on
economic issues. As a consequence, social integration has
substantially lagged behind economic integration. In fact, the

155.
156.
157.
158.

See Stoelting, supranote 77, at 212.
See ft.
See BENGOETXEA, supra note 82, at 14.
See id

159.
160.

See 0- at 14-15.
Article 2 states in full:

It shall be the aim of the Community, by establishing a Common Market
and progressively approximating the economic policies of Member States,
to promote throughout the Community a harmonious development of

economic activities, a continuous and balanced expansion, an increased
stability, an accelerated raising of the standard of living and closer
relations between its Member States.
EEC TREATY art. 2.

1110

VANDERBILTJOURIVAL OFTRANSNATIONALLAW

[VoL 30:1087

original signatories of the founding treaties appeared to have been
concerned with social integration only as a component of
1
16

economic integration.
The six original signatory members of the EEC Treaty shared
relatively common social policies, and as a result, social policies
were not a high priority; 16 2 however, the EEC Treaty does contain
several provisions pertaining to social policy. 1 6 3 In particular,
Article 119 mandates equal pay for equal work, regardless of the
market gender. 16 4
It is the only provision promoting equal
opportunities and one of the few provisions expressly stating a

basic human right. 165 Although Article 119 addresses a social

issue, its insertion was based on economic considerations. 166 In
fact, because requirements relating to equal pay for equal work

161. Roelofs. supra note 37, at 123. See Odile Quintin, The Policles of the
European Communities with Special Reference to the Labour Market in WOMEN,
EQUAUTY AND EUROPE 71 (Mary Buckley & Malcolm Anderson eds., 1988).
162. See Commissioner Padraig Flynn, Will Europe Work (television
broadcast, July 22, 1996). Commissioner Flynn indicated that between 1957 and
the first enlargement of the EU in 1973, only two major social policy Issues were
addressed by the Member States: the free movement of workers and equal
opportunities. Both of these social issues were largely based on economic
principles. See id.
163. EEC TREATY arts. 117-22. Articles 117, 118, and 119 are the main
provisions pertaining to social policy. Id. art. 117-119. Article 117 pertains to
the improvement of living and working conditions; Article 118 proposes
collaboration between Member States on issues arising in the social arena; Article
119 pertains to equal pay for equal work. Id.
164. Article 119 states:
[Each Member State shall in the course of the first stage ensure and
subsequently maintain the application of the principle of equal
remuneration for equal work as between men and women workers. For
purposes of this Article, remuneration shall mean the ordinary basic or
minimum wage or salary and any additional emoluments whatsoever
payable directly or indirectly, whether in cash or in kind, by the employer
to the worker and arising out of the workers' employment. Equal
remuneration without discrimination based on sex means: (a) that
remuneration for the same work at piece-rates shall be calculated on the
basis of the same unit of measurement; and (b) that remuneration for
work at time-rates shall be the same for the same job.
EEC TRATY art 119.
165. Roger J. Goebel, Employee Rights in the European Community: A
PanoramaFrom the 1974 Social Action Program to the Social Charterof 1989, 17
H-AsnNGs fRfL & COMP. L. REv. 1, 30 (1993).
Professor Goebel noted two
additional significant characteristics of Article 119. First, the article Is more
specific In asserting a social goal in contrast to the broader language provided in
Article 117, which pertains to working conditions and the standard of living for
workers. Second, although Article 119 provides a broad definition of the term
"pay," it is narrow in that it limits the goal of equality to "equal pay" as opposed to
encompassing working conditions in general. See (Cd; see also Roelofs, supranote
37, at 131.
166. SeeRoelofs, supranote 37, at 131.
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had already been implemented in France, the French government
insisted on the inclusion of Article 119 to prevent economic
activity from being diverted to other countries where employers
6 7
could exploit gender-based wage discrimination. 1

Despite Article 119, many Member States initially did not
adhere to the principle of equal pay, and the broad disparity
between men and women's wages remained. 168 Reflecting the
emerging realization that social policy was an important
component in a diversified and expanding Europe, the Council of
Ministers in 1974 adopted the first Social
Action Program,
16 9
proposing a more aggressive social policy.
To implement the Social Action Program, the Council enacted
a series of directives: the Equal Pay Directive in 1975, the Equal
Treatment Directive in 1976, and the Directive on Equality in
Social Security in 1978.170 The Equal Pay Directive attempted to
clarify Article 119 by defining the phrase "equal pay for equal
work" as equal pay for work of equal value. 17 1 Significantly,
however, the Equal Pay Directive failed to address women's
inadequate access to the labor market. Primarily employed in
lower-paying positions, women required equal opportunity to
compete and advance in the workplace. 17 2 Recognizing the
absence of a provision promoting equal access to employment, the

167.

Id.

168. Id. Pursuant to Article 119, Member States were required to
implement the principle of equal pay by 1961. Sara P. Crovitz, Equal Pay in the
EuropeanComnunty: PracticalandPhilosophicalGoals, 1992 U. CH. LEGAL F. 477,

479. The Member States, however, did not adhere to this schedule and thus
implemented their own timetable, which expired in 1964. The Member States
again failed to adhere to the schedule. Thus, the Commission passed the Equal
Pay Directive to reinstate and clarify Member States' obligations to the principle of
equal pay for equal work. See id.
169. See Tanya M. Shively, Sexual HarassmentIn The European Union:King
Rex Meets Potiphar's Wife, 55 LA. L. REV. 1087, 1107 (1995). The primary
objectives of the Social Action Program were to strengthen employment at
community, national, and regional levels, to improve living and working
conditions, and to increase the involvement of management and labor in regard to
social policies.
See id.
Three subsequent social programs have been
implemented to further strengthen women's position in the workplace.
Respectively entitled the Second, Third, and Fourth Social Action Programs, these
programs were implemented between the years 1982-85, 1986-90, and 1991-95.
See ELus, supra note 64, at 40; see generally Goebel, supra note 165 (discussing
the development and implementation of social policies between 1974 and 1989).
170.
Roelofs, supra note 37, at 131-32. While the Social Action Programs
promoted social policy through legislative action, the directives provided a basis
for implementation of such policies. See Shively, supranote 169, at 1107.
171.
See Crovitz, supranote 168, at 479.
172.
Elena Noel, Prevention of Gender Discriminatton Within the European
Union, 9 N.Y. INT'LL. REv. 77, 83-84 (1996).
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Council responded by adopting the Equal Treatment Directive
(hereinafter Directive). 173
Article 1 of the Directive states that the purpose of the

Directive is "to put into effect in the Member States the principle
of equal treatment for men and women as regards access to

employment ...
'.174
The main objective of the Directive is to
prohibit sex discrimination, as enunciated in Article 2, paragraph
1 (Article 2(1)), which defines the principle of equal treatment.

This provision states, "there shall be no discrimination
whatsoever on the grounds of sex either directly or indirectly
"175

The Directive, however, failed to define the concepts of
"direct" and "indirect" discrimination. As a result, Member States

have had little guidance in their attempts to interpret what
constitutes discrimination. 176 The more concrete a definition of
discrimination, the easier it is to establish that discrimination
against an individual or a group has occurred. Thus, it should
have been apparent that the absence of a coherent definition

could lead to restrictive interpretations by both legislative and
judicial institutions. 17 7 In fact, guidelines may still be necessary

from EU institutions, in particular the ECJ, to achieve a uniform
application of the Directive by all Member States. 178 Realistically,

173. See Id. at 84-85; see also Jill Andrews, Comment, National and
InternationalSources of Women's Right to Equal Employment Opportunities:Equality
in Law Versus Equality in Fact, 14 Nw. J. INTL L. & B. 413, 422 (1994) (discussing
the Equal Treatment Directive's purpose and requirements).
174. Council Directive, supranote 2, at art. 1(1). The Preamble of the Equal
Treatment Directive states:
Whereas Community action to achieve the principle of equal treatment for
men and women in respect of access to employment and vocational
training and promotion and In respect of other working conditions also
appears to be necessary; whereas, equal treatment for male and female
workers constitutes one of the objectives of the Community, in so far as
the harmonization of living and working conditions while maintaining their
improvement are inter aliato be furthered ....
Id. at 40.
175. Article 2(1) states In full, "[flor the purposes of the following provisions,
the principle of equal treatment shall mean that there shall be no discrimination
whatsoever on grounds of sex either directly or indirectly by reference In
particular to marital or family status." Council Directive, supranote 2. at art. 2(1).
The insertion of the phrase 'by reference" suggests that marriage and family
status are merely two examples of discrimination. See ELuiS, supra note 64, at
136-37.
176. PREcHAL & BURRows, supranote 97, at 106.
177. See kI.
178. See Id.
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however, some room will always
exist for national interpretation
79
and judicial maneuvering. 1

Traditionally, direct discrimination is understood as meaning
unequal treatment on the basis of sex or on the basis of features
distinctly related to gender. 180 Direct discrimination is forbidden
8
within the EU, except for a few legal exemptions.' ' Indirect
discrimination occurs when unequal treatment is imposed on
persons on the basis of a criterion other than sex, resulting in a
disadvantage to persons of only one sex. 18 2
Regardless of
whether any intention to discriminate
exists, indirect
18 3
discrimination occurs when the actual effect is discriminatory.
In general, direct discrimination is easier to counter through legal
measures than is indirect discrimination, which often results in

ambiguous discrepancies in determining which individuals or
184
groups have been the targets of discrimination.
Although direct discrimination is specifically prohibited, three
justified exceptions exist. Article 2, paragraph 2 (hereinafter

Article 2(2)) authorizes a distinction on the basis of sex in
instances in which gender is a determining factor in the nature of
an occupation or in the ability of individuals to perform certain
occupational activities. 18 5 Two examples of the former include

179. See id.
180. See &LFor instance, criterion based on characteristics common to one
sex, such as pregnancy, are considered examples of direct discrimination. See iL
at 107.
181. See van Vleuten, supranote 63, at 151.
182. See iL The Commission defined the term indirect discrimination "as
referring to hidden discrimination which might in practice affect workers of one
sex as a result of marital or family status being taken into account in determining
the rights covered by the two Directives." MmAjJ. GONZALEZ, CoMMUNnY lAW AND
WoMEN 36 (1986) (discussing Directives 76/207 and 79/7). One example of
indirect discrimination is imposing a maximum age limit for entering an
occupation with the effect that women who rear children during their 20s or 30s
are excluded from the field. PRECHAL & BURRows, supra note 97, at 108. Another
example is providing full-time workers with more legal benefits than part-time
workers. See &d. Again, women may be at a disadvantage because more women
than men work part-time because of domestic responsibilities. See cL
183. See PRECHAL & BuRRowS, supra note 97, at 106-07.
Objective
justifications for discriminatory practices may be accepted, however, when an
employer can demonstrate (generally through statistical data) the adverse effect of
a particular criterion that would require differential treatment. See van Vleuten,
supranote 63, at 156-57. Determining what constitutes an objective justification
Is often difficult. Id. at 151. Courts should take care in constructing a definition,
however, because a definition that is too broad may otherwise contradict the
prohibition against discrimination. Id. See Case 170/84, Bilka v. Weber Von
Hartz, 1986 E.C.R. 1607, 1628 (specifying the criteria for objective justification).
184. See van Vleuten, supranote 63, at 153.
185. See PRECHAL & BURRows, supra note 97, at 110. This distinction is
based on the nature of the job versus the context of the work. See fdL Article 2(2)
states:
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occupations such as actress/actor or soprano/bass singer. Some
examples of the latter include occupations such as firemen,
civilian employees in military security departments, supervisors
in educational boarding school establishments, and certain
sectors of the police department. 186 Often, the distinctions
implicit in the latter category are influenced by stereotypes and
inherent biases defining occupations traditionally associated with
only one sex.18 7 The allowance of such distinctions has been
188
criticized by the Commission, which supports their elimination.
Article 2, paragraph 3 (hereinafter Article 2(3)) specifically
permits protective measures benefiting women in pregnancy and
maternity.18 9 The ECJ stated in Hofmiann v. Banner Ersatzkasse
that Article 2(3) recognizes that "it is legitimate to ensure the
protection of a woman's biological condition during pregnancy...
[and] ... to protect the special relationship between a woman and
her child over the period which follows pregnancy and
childbirth." 1 90
Finally, Article 2, paragraph 4 (hereinafter Article 2(4))
authorizes the implementation of measures directed toward
eliminating existing inequalities that affect women's opportunities
in the workplace. Article 2(4) states, "This Directive shall be
without prejudice to measures to promote equal opportunity for
men and women, in particular by removing existing inequalities
which affect women's opportunities in the areas referred to in
Article 1MI)." 19 1 Accordingly, Article 2(4) expressly allows for the

This Directive shall be without prejudice to the right of Member States to

exclude form its field of application those occupational activities and,
where appropriate, the training leading thereto, for which, by reason of
their nature or the context in which they are carried out, the sex of the
worker constitutes a determining factor.
Council Directive, supranote 2, at art. 2(2).
186. See PRECHAL & BURROWS, supranote 97, at 109-10.
187. See U The distinctions have been attributed to such factors as safety,
unpleasant working conditions, or religious, moral, or social reasons. See t.
There is a vast difference between Member States as to the number of
occupations excluded from the principle of non-discrimination; some Member
States have relatively few exclusions while others have many. Because
exclusions pertaining to the nature of the work are often a result of historical or
social biases, it may be necessary for the EU to implement a list of permissible
occupational activities that may be excluded. See Ud
188. See van Vleuten, supranote 63, at 156.
189. Council Directive, supranote 2. at art. 2(3).
190. Case 184/83, Hofiann v. Barmer Ersatzkasse, 1984 E.C.R. 3047,
3075.
191. Council Directive, spranote 2, at art. 2(4).

19971

POSITIVE ACTION PROGRAMS iN THE EU

1115

possibility of preferential treatment and concomitantly positive
19 2
action programs.

Positive action is a vehicle for achieving equal opportunities
and provides preferential treatment to members of a
disadvantaged group by granting them a temporarily
advantageous position.193
Because the principle of equal
treatment mandates that law be gender-neutral, Member States
must be careful not to implement programs that are contrary to
this principle. 19 4 Depending on the depth and nature of positive
action programs, however, the results can be both extensive and
effective in combatting the inequities women face in the labor
market.
In fact, the Commission has recently formulated several
positive action policies and, in concert with the Council, has
encouraged Member States to recruit and promote women in both
private and public sectors in which they are underrepresented. 195
Some of the Commission's policies include
distributing informational materials designed to raise awareness
in matters of equality, diversifying the occupational opportunities
for women, and adopting6 a more expansive range of educational
19
and vocational choices.

192.

The Advocate-General commented in Hofmann v. BannerErsatzkasse.

The exception set out in Article 2(4) is in a category of its own. The
provision opens the way for national measures "to promote equal
opportunity for men and women, in particular by removing existing
inequalities." It merely appears to make an exception to the principle: in
aiming to compensate for existing discrimination it seeks to re-establish
equality and not to prejudice it. In other words, since it presupposes that
there is an inequality which must be removed, the exception must be
broadly construed.
Hofmann, 1984 E.C.R. at 3082.
193. See van Vleuten, supra note 63, at 156. Advocate General Tesauro
summarized that positive action "marks a transition from the individual vision to
the collective vision of equality." Case C-450/93, Eckhard Kalanke v. Freie
Hansestadt Bremen, 1995 E.C.R. 1-3051, 1-3058.
194. See van Vleuten, supra note 63, at 156.
195. See Jong & Bock, supra note 5, at 185.
196. Id. The term "positive action" was initially defined more broadly in the
EU than in the United States. Id. Eventually, the Commission used the term to
refer to measures solely related to the position of women in employment. In
Positive Action Manual, published in 1988 by the Commission, "positive action"
was defined as follows:
[Aims to complement legislation regarding equal treatment and comprises
any measure contributing to the elimination of inequalities in practice. A
positive action programme will allow an organization to track down and
eliminate every form of discrimination in its employment policy and to
neutralize the effects of past discrimination. A positive action programme
is a comprehensive planning process which an employer chooses to
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The Commission contended that such policies are significant
not only socially, but also economically, as the participation of
women in the labor force continues to increase. 19 7 In fact, the
Council stated in the Recommendation on the Promotion of
Positive Action for Women in 1984:

[E]xisting legal provisions on equal treatment, which are designed
to afford rights to individuals, are inadequate for the elimination of
all existing inequalities unless parallel action Is taken by
governments, both sides of industry and other bodies concerned, to
counteract the prejudicial effects on women in employment which
arise from social attitudes, behaviour and structures. 19 8

In an effort to counteract the existing prejudicial effects on
women and to encourage increased participation of women in

occupations in which they are under-represented, the Council
recommended that all Member States adopt positive action
policies to eliminate such inequalities. 19 9 Both the Commission

and the Council have been instrumental in establishing the four
social action programs. 20 0 In addition, the Commission recently
began reporting on the results of positive action programs in the
various Member States, thereby providing an impetus for further
20
action. 1
Many Member States have adopted positive action programs
in accordance with the EU's provisos. For instance, the U.K.,

recognized

for its progressive

policies

on women's

issues,

implemented positive action programs for women and minorities
in 1985. 2 0 2 Similarly, the French have introduced a variety of

undertake in order to try and achieve a more balanced representation of
women and men throughout the work force and thus making possible a
more efficient use of the available skills and talents in the work force.

Id. at 186 (quoting COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNmES, Positive Action
Manual 10 (1988)).
197. 1d at 185.
198. Council Recommendation on the Promotion of Positive Action for
Women 84/635, 1984 O.J. (L 331) 34.
199. See U
The Council listed several steps to help ensure the
implementation of positive action measures, including: increasing awareness of
the need to promote equality of opportunity for working women; providing studies
on women's position in the labor market; diversifying vocational choices; adapting
working conditions to better accommodate the needs of women; and encouraging
measures that increase the participation and responsibility of women in the
workforce. See Ud.at 35. Member States are thus encouraged to recruit and
promote women in the labor market.
200. Jong & Bock, supranote 5, at 187. See also supranote 166.
201. Jong &Bock, supranote 5, at 187.
202. Id. Initially, the positive action programs were specifically confined to
training and education. For instance, employers were permitted to organize
special courses for both women and men in sectors in which they were
underrepresented. Id. In 1985, however, the Equal Opportunities Commission's
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measures designed to achieve equal treatment, such as
renouncing the practice of rejecting women for occupational
positions solely out of fear that family obligations may
interfere.2 0 3 The Netherlands has implemented plans that provide
employment targets for women in certain occupational positions,
and Belgium has mandated positive action for all public sector
organizations. 20 4
Significantly, Germany has also enacted
legislation providing preferential treatment for 5 women,
20
particularly in appointments to government positions.
While Article 2(4) clearly encourages the creation of positive

action programs, Article 2(l) prohibits

any discrimination

whatsoever, presumably including reverse discrimination.
Whether measures promoting equality, even in sectors in which
women are structurally under-represented, are considered
discriminatory has been deferred to the judiciary. Only recently,
in the Kalanke case, has the issue been presented to the ECJ for

adjudication.
On October 17, 1995, in the case of Kalanke v. Freie
Hansestadt Bremen (City of Bremen), the ECJ issued a
preliminary ruling declaring a German state law contrary to the
Equal Treatment Directive.20 6 The plaintiff, Mr.
Eckhard
Kalanke, a German civil servant, was denied a promotion to a
managerial position. 20 7 Instead, the Breman Parks Department
chose his equally qualified female counterpart. 20 8 In accordance
with the Landesgleichstelungsgesetz (Bremen local law on equal
treatment for Men and Women in the Public Service), a woman
with the same qualifications as a man who is applying for the
same position must be given priority if women are underThe Bremen law stipulated that underrepresented. 20 9

Code of Practice initiated guidelines for implementing positive action programs.
Id.
203. Id. The French have employed equal protection measures since 1982.
Id.
204.

Id.

205. Id. at 188.
Most Member States have implemented publicity
campaigns designed to increase women s awareness of their position in the labor
market. These campaigns include research on the position of working women
and publication of the results, positive action programs, guidelines for employers,
and brochures and films. Id.
206. Kalanke, 1995 E.C.IR I- 3051.
207.
208.

Id. at 1-3073.
Id. Kalanke held a diploma in horticulture and landscape gardening

and had worked for the Parks Department since 1973 as permanent assistant to
the Section Manager. The woman who received the promotion had held a diploma
in landscape gardening since 1983 and had worked for the Parks Department as
a horticultural employee since 1975. Id.

209. Id. at 1-3072. Paragraph four of the Bremen law provides that "in the
case of an appointment... which is not made for training purposes, women who
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representation is deemed to exist when women do not constitute
"at least half of the staff in the individual pay, remuneration and
salary brackets in the relevant personnel group within a
2 10
department.
Although the Parks Department management recommended
the plaintiff for the position, the Staff Committee rejected this
recommendation. 2 1 1 The matter was referred to arbitration and
then to a conciliation board. The board held that the two
candidates were equally qualified and that, because women were
under-represented in the Parks Department, Bremen law required
2 12
the position be given to the woman.
The plaintiff appealed to the Arbeitsgericht (Local Labour
Court), contending that he was better qualified and that the
Bremen law was contrary to German Basic Law and to provisions
of the German Civil Code. 2 13 The Arbeitsgericht dismissed the
case, however, and the plaintiff was unsuccessful on appeal to the
Landesarbeitsgericht (Regional Labour Court).2 14 The plaintiff
then appealed to the Bundesarbeitsgericht (Federal Labour Court)
on points of law. 2 15 While the Federal Labour Court held the
Bremen law compatible with German constitutional and statutory
provisions, the court was uncertain whether the Bremen law was
consistent with the European Equal Treatment Directive. Thus,
the court referred the issue to the ECJ, requesting a preliminary
ruling on the interpretation of Articles 2(1) and 2(4) of the
Directive. 2 16 The federal court questioned whether these two
provisions precluded national rules, similar to Bremen's, that
automatically gave priority to equally qualified women in sectors
2 17
in which they were under-represented.
2 18
The ECJ, after almost twelve months of deliberation,
invalidated the Bremen law, holding it inconsistent with the

have the same qualifications as men applying for the same post are to be given
priority in sectors where they are under-represented." Id.
210. See id.
211. Seed.
212.
213.

See id.
See Id. at 1-3073-74.

214. Id. at 1-3074.
215. See id.
216. See id. In its request for a preliminary ruling, the German court noted
that Bremen implemented its law in response to disadvantages women faced
there; the court cited figures showing the low proportion of women in higher
career positions among Bremen city employees. Id.
217. Id.
at 1-3076.
218. See Gerard O'Dwyer, Nonvay Defies Europe's Gender Ruling; Mintsters
Say EuropeanCourt Directiveis 'Inferior,'MONTREAL GAzgrra, Feb. 12, 1996, at E2,
availableIn 1996 WL 4170091.
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intention of the Equal Treatment Directive. 2 19 Interpreting Article
2(1), which defines equal treatment as "no discrimination
whatsoever on grounds of sex either directly or indirectly ....
"
220
the ECJ concluded that the Bremen law was discrlmlnatory.
The ECJ contended that "[a] national rule that, where men and
women who are candidates for the same promotion are equally
qualified, women are automatically to be given priority in sectors
where they are under-represented, involves discrimination on
grounds of sex."2 2 1 The ECJ did not further address Article 2(l)
or explain the reasoning behind its interpretation. Simply stated,
however, discrimination occurs when there is a difference in
treatment or favor of a class in disregard of individual merit. This
case presented such an example.
The ECJ continued its analysis by referring to Article 2(4),
which specifically provides one of the exceptions to the basic
principle of equal treatment stated in Article 2(1). Article 2(4)
provides for the implementation of measures which, regardless of
their discriminatory nature, promote equal opportunities for men
and women by removing instances of existing inequalities relating
to women's opportunities. 2 2 2 Article 2(4), therefore, broadens the
confines of Article 2(1) by approving positive action programs
designed to improve women's access to employment opportunities
and to increase their competitive advantage in the labor market.
In fact, the ECJ explicitly stated that measures relating to access

to employment, including promotion, are permissible. 223 For this
proposition, the ECJ cited Commission v. F rance,2 24 the only case
prior to Kalanke in which it ruled on the interpretation of Article
2(4).
In Commission v. France, the ECJ held that the exception
allowed positive action measures that, although discriminatory in
appearance, were in fact intended to eliminate existing
inequalities. 22 5
In addition, the ECJ in Kalanke quoted the
preamble of the Council Recommendation on the Promotion of

219. See Kalanke, 1995 E.C.R- at 1-3078. Advocate General G. Tesauro
delivered a similar Opinion at the sitting of the Full Court on April 6, 1995. See
id. at 1-3067-68.
220. Council Directive, supranote 2, at art. 2(1); Kaanke, 1995 E.C.I. at I3076-77.
221. Kaanke, 1995 E.C.R. at 1-3077.
222. Council Directive, supranote 2, at art. 2(4).
223. Kalnke, 1995 E.C.R. at 1-3077 (citing Case 312/86, Commission v.
France, 1988 E.C.R. 6315).
224. Case 312/86, Commission v. France, 1988 E.C.R 6315.
225. I. at 6336. Following this interpretation, the ECJ contended that
Article 2(4) did not allow the implementation of special rights for women, such as
shorter working hours, leaves of absence when children are ill, or additional
compensation for child care. Id. at 6336-37.
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Positive Action for Women (hereinafter Council Recommendation),
which promotes the enactment of national measures designed to
eliminate existing inequalities in the workplace. 2 26 The ECJ's
reference to the Council Recommendation, at a minimum, reflects
its awareness of the need for measures to be implemented on a
national level.
Nevertheless, the ECJ contended that the derogation allowed
by Article 2(4) "must be interpreted strictly."2 2 7 With this preface,
the ECJ continued to hold that providing absolute priorities to
women is inconsistent with the objectives of Article 2(4).228 The
ECJ specifically asserted that such measures that guarantee
women absolute and unconditional priority for appointment "go
beyond promoting equal opportunities and overstep the limits of
the exception in Article 2(4)."229 To provide further guidance both
to the German courts and to courts in other Member States, the
ECJ clarified this statement by distinguishing between "equal
representation" (as prescribed by automatic preferences) and
.equal access."
The ECJ concluded that the German law
substituted the end for the means, and that, although the
Directive permits measures promoting equal opportunity, it does
230
not permit automatic preferences.
Although the ECJ concluded that the Bremen law
overstepped the limits of Article 2(4), it did not indicate what
those limits were. 2 3 1 Although little may be gleaned from the
ECJ's ruling regarding the permissible scope of positive action
programs, some insight can be obtained from the opinion

submitted by Advocate General Tesauro.

23 2

Tesauro's opinion

emphasizes the distinction between removing obstacles that

226. SeeKalanke, 1995 E.C.R at 1-3077
227. Id. at 1-3078 (citing Case 222/84, Johnston v. Chief Constable of the
Royal Ulster Constabulary, 1986 E.C.R. 1651, 36).
228. Id.
229. Id.

230. Id. The Advocate General reasoned that the Bremen positive action
program was disproportionate to the objective of Article 2(4) "since that aim
remains that of achieving equal opportunities for men and women and not of
guaranteeing women the result where conditions are equal." Id. at 1-3066.
231. Possibly this is a result of disagreement among the judges, who must
unanimously agree on a judgment and may not publish dissenting opinions. As

one former ECJ law clerk noted, "Sometimes you can see the disagreement in the
wording of the final judgment." See James Pressley & Brian Coleman, Ruling
Class: EU Court DiscoversThere's More to Law Than Coal and Steel: Justices Exert
New Authority Over States andBusiness; Challengeto PowerArises:An Enlightened
Old Boys Club?, WALL ST. J. (Europe), Dec. 19, 1995, at 9, available in 1995 WL-

WSJE 12634910. That the Kalanke opinion only contained two paragraphs of
reasoning, the clerk noted, "was a sign to me that the judges could not reach an
agreement." Id.
232. Kalanke, 1995 E.C.R. at 1-3058.
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prevent women from achieving the same results as men and
bestowing the results directly on women simply because they are
women. While his conclusion that the Bremen law oversteps the
provisions of the Directive is legally justifiable, his analysis is
based primarily on his own personal viewpoints regarding reverse
discrimination. Nevertheless, it is a welcome contrast to the
ECJ's sparse justification for its own holding.
Tesauro's report provides additional insight into the ECJ's
distinction between equal access and equal representation. In
distinguishing these principles, Tesauro noted that positive action
measures may be structured according to three theoretical models
of equality, 2 33 two of which are relevant here. The first model
emphasizes the means to the end and seeks to remove existing

barriers that impede women's ability to participate and advance in
the labor market. Remedial measures might include vocational
training, improved working conditions, or encouraging women's
active participation in fields in which they are under2 34
represented.
The second model seeks to remove inequalities through
quotas or goals and defines equality through quantitative
figures. 2 3 5 This model forces results rather than eliminating
causes and legitimizes quotas and goals as a means of removing
inequalities. Tesauro's opinion implies that measures promoting
"substantive equality" are consistent with the Directive, while
those promoting "formal equality" are not.2 3 6
Therefore, while the Directive allows positive action directed
toward providing equal opportunities, it does not mandate equal
Tesauro contends that Kalanke and his female
results.
counterpart's presumably equivalent qualifications were evidence
that neither had been disadvantaged regarding employment
The Bremen law, by providing automatic
opportunities.
preferences to women, thus serves as a means of attaining formal
equality as opposed to substantive equality.
Whether or not the Advocate-General's opinion reflects the
ECJ's reasoning in Kalanke, the ECJ's holding may result in
future litigation by other individuals in positions similar to

233.
234.
235.

Id.
Id.
Id.

236. Advocate General Tesauro defiantly stated, "Formal, numerical
equality is an objective which may salve some consciences, but it will remain
illusory and devoid of all substance unless it is [sic] goes together with measures
which are genuinely destined to achieve equality, which was not the case in this
instance .... " Id. at 1-3067.
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Kalanke's. 2 3 7 Moreover, it is probable that the ECJ will receive an
increase in requests for preliminary rulings by Member States
struggling to formulate policies that comport with Kalanke yet
promote women's access to job opportunities. Finally, Kalanke
poses the problem that the decision may invite discrimination by
limiting the realm of acceptable policies Members States can
implement in attempting to "promote equal opportunities for men
and women" as the Directive requires.
V. THE EUROPEAN RESPONSE
In response to the Court's ruling in Kalanke, criticism arose
throughout the EU's Member States as well as within EU
institutions. The Commission, which had previously implemented
positive action programs within its own department, quickly
Commissioner of Social Affairs
denounced the decision. 2 38
Padraig Flynn contended Kalanke could have sweeping
implications for all positive action programs in the Community
and stated that the Commission would attempt to constrain the
ruling's impact. 2 39 In particular, Flynn warned of conflicts
between Kalanke and the Commission's recommendation that
states implement positive action programs-a recommendation
passed by Member States in 1984.240 In fact, most EU states
have already implemented positive action programs. For example,
Italy has more than fifty programs in effect within the corporate
sector, 24 1 and other Member States, such as the U.K., France,

Netherlands, and Belgium, have implemented several programs in
Reflecting concern
both public and private sectors. 2 42
surrounding the judgment, Flynn's spokesperson commented that

237. For example, the case of Marschall v. Nordrhein-Westfalen (Case
409/95), in which a man was denied a promotion in favor of a woman due to the
under-representation of women in that position, has been referred to the Court
for a preliminary ruling. Advocate-General Jacobs has recommended that the
reasoning used in Kalanke apply to this case. See Advocate-General Upholds
Kalanke Ruling, EuR REP., May 17, 1997, available tn LEXIS, News Library,
EURRPT File.
238. See Frances Gibb & Charles Bremner, Euro Court Outlaws 'Jobs For
Women' Programmes,TIMEs (London), Oct. 18, 1995.
239. Red Faces at Commission, As Court Outlaws Affirmative Action, Agence
France-Presse, Oct. 17, 1995, availableIn 1995 WL 7868961.
240. See Gibb &Bremner, supranote 238.
241. Robert Rice et al., Women Job Quota 'Unlawfil', FIN. TMEs, Oct. 18,
1995, at 20. See also supranotes 200-05 and accompanying text.
242. See generallyJong & Bock, supranote 5.
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the Commission was "afraid that the psychological damage of this
24 3
court judgment could be big."
Advocates of women's rights alleged that the ruling would
impede, if not reverse, women's progress toward achieving
245
equality in the workplace. 24 4 The European Women's Lobby
stated it was "shocked and disappointed" by the ruling,2 4 6 and
Norway denounced the ruling, stating its intention to maintain its
current gender laws, considered the most progressive of any
Western nation.2 4 7 Although Norway is not one of the fifteen
members of the EU, 2 48 it is obligated to adhere to ECJ rulings as
a member of the European Economic Area, created in 1994 to
further promote trade throughout Europe and the rest of the
world. 2 49 The premier of Norway's Labor government, Gro Harlem

Brundtland, stated that Norway would not upset years of hard
work by implementing this rule.2 50 Brundtland further criticized

the Directive as "behind the times," predicting that no other

Scandinavian country 25 1 would adjust its laws to comport with
the ruling.
243.

2 52

See Regine Wosnitza, Court Ruling Casts Doubt on Fate of Europe's

Afftnmative Action Programs, DALLAs MORNING NEws, Dec.

9. 1995, at 42A.

availabLein LEXIS, News Library, DALNWS File.
244. Women Lose CourtFightforJobs, Promotions,supranote 3, atA5.
245. The European Women's Lobby is a coalition of EU national women's
groups. Id.
246. Id.
247. O'Dwyer, supranote 218, at E2.
248. In 1972, when Denmark, Ireland, and the U.K. decided to join the EU,
Norway was presented with the same opportunity. Norway's voting population
rejected Norwegian membership in the Union, however, out of concern for
Norwegian fisheries, oil supplies, environmental policies, and progressive social
programs. FIscHER, supra note 19, at 251. Even when Austria, Finland, and
Sweden voted to join the EU in 1995, Norwegians again voted "no," by a 52% to
48% margin. Id. See also supranote 25.
249. Id. In 1994, the 15 Member States of the EU and all of the EFrA
countries except Switzerland created the European Economic Area (hereinafter
EEA to promote trade. The EEA is the world's largest integrated market and
constitutes more than two-fifths of all world trade. HARRISON, supra note 9, at
160.
250. O'Dwyer, supranote 218, at E2.
251. In fact, most of the 48% of Swedes who rejected Sweden's decision to
join the EU were women. Wosnitza, supra note 245, at 42A. The Kalanke ruling
further delays Swedish women's acceptance of the EU and its policies. The
assistant secretary at the Swedish Ministry of Social Affairs stated, "We want to
have the freedom to use affirmative action if we find that it is a good method to
use." Id. The Swedish government began discussing with women's groups,
unions, and management how best to respond to this ruling. Id.
252. In 1976, Norway enacted the Gender Equality Act, which required
employers to favor women in employment if they have the same qualifications as
their male counterparts. O'Dwyer, supra note 218, at E2. Certain professions
have implemented their own quota systems, including the nation's parliament,
which has a quota requirement of 40% for either sex. Id. Although Norway has
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Perhaps the strongest reaction came from those immediately
affected by the ruling. Bremen's Senator for Women, Christine
Wischer, stated that the ruling would compel Germany to reexamine its acceptance of European institutions. 25 3 Throughout
Germany, politicians petitioned the government to address the
issue at the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference. 25 4 In fact,
German delegate Lissy Groener, spokeswoman for the Social
Democratic Women in the European Parliament, denounced the
ruling, stating, "The verdict shows that there is a considerable
gap in equal rights on the European level," and noted that "a
tendency is visible here, that, regarding affirmative action, the icy
25 5
wind is again blowing from the front."
However, the U.K.'s response differed dramatically from the
responses of other Member States. In Britain, both the Equal
Opportunities
Commission (hereinafter EOC)
and the

Confederation of British Industry applauded and welcomed the
ECJ's ruling.256 The ruling confirmed the U.K.'s current
legislation prohibiting positive discrimination while permitting
special gender-based training initiatives. 2 57 In particular, the
EOC expressed its opposition to positive discrimination on the
ground that it appoints women to occupational positions because
8
of their sex and not their merit.25
Throughout the European Community, members of the legal
community joined ranks with the U.K., claiming that the ruling is
simply a blunt reminder of the Directive's language. One of the
judges of the ECJ, Judge David A. 0. Edward, aptly asked, "Has
the court done any more than say there comes a point at which
'positive discrimination' is discrimination?" 2 5 9
In fact, the
International Labour Organization urged governments not to
overreact to the ruling and reminded them that this judgment did
not prohibit positive action programs per se but only invalidated
the Bremen law on the ground that it went too far. 26 0 More than
invalidating a positive action program, however, the ruling

refused to comply with the ECJ's ruling, the ECJ does not Intend to petition
Norway to adhere to its ruling. Id. Generally, countries that refuse to abide by
ECJ directions either appeal the ruling or enact new statutes to safeguard Its

national laws. Id.
253. Rice et al., supranote 241, at 20.
254. Id.
255. Wosnitza, supranote 243, at 42A.
256. Rice et al., supranote 241, at 20.
257.
258.
259.

Id.
Id.
James Pressley, Rules of the Game: Sex-Discrimination Case Shows

Anomaly In EULaw,WALL ST.J. (Europe), Oct. 31, 1995, at 4, available in 1995
WL-WSJE 9090973.
260.

Rice et al., supranote 241, at 20.
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illustrated1 that the Equal Treatment Directive was poorly
26
drafted.
Some scholars' criticism of the ECJ's opinion may reflect
their objections to the Directive itself, rather than to Kalanke's
reasoning. Although the decision is consistent with the Directive,
some now find the Directive inadequate. 2 62 Although Article 119
of the EEC Treaty provides equal work for equal pay, no
analogous article addressing hiring practices exists. 2 6 3 The Equal
Treatment Directive, adopted to placate such criticism, has not
provided the results envisioned by many members of the EU. One
reason for this may be that many EU laws are neither precise nor
complete. 2 6 4 Several factors may account for such poor drafting,
including the novelty of the EU, the difficulties in compromising
among the Member States, and the inability of the EU to
overcome bureaucratic constraints in responding to EU
265
concerns.
Many who believe the Directive should be changed urged
their governments to address the issue and redraft provisions of
266
the Directive at the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference (IGC).
In fact, in March 1996, the Commission, anxious to end the
controversy surrounding the Kalanke case, issued a draft
proposal to amend Article 2(4). The draft proposal, which seeks to

reflect the ECJ's judgment, states:
[Tihis Directive shall be without prejudice to measures to promote
equal opportunity for men and women in particular by removing
existing inequalities which affect the opportunities of the underrepresented sex in the areas referred to in Article 1(1). Possible
measures shall include the giving of preference, as regards access
to employment or promotion, to a member of the underrepresented sex, provided that such measures do not preclude the
assessment of the particular circumstances of an individual
267
case.
261.

Pressley, supranote 231, at 6-7.

262.

It should be emphasized that the EJ's role is not to make social

policy, but instead to provide judicial insurance that EU law is interpreted
uniformly.
263.
264.

Wosnitza, supranote 243, at 42A.
NUGENr, supranote 9, at 175.

265.

Id.

266.

Wosnitza, supra note 243, at 42A. The IGC was convened in March

1996 to revise the Maastrlcht Treaty and to prepare the Union for further
enlargement.
267. Commission of the European Communities, Equal Treatment Between
Women and Men: EuropeanCommission Clarifies the Kalanke Ruling, RAPID, Mar.
27, 1996, availabLe in LEXIS, News Library, RAPID File. The Commission listed
examples of permissible positive action, including devising plans for promoting

women; prescribing proportions in which women should be represented but
avoiding automatic preferences: obligating employers to recruit persons of the
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The draft proposal also provides examples of positive action
programs that are permissible and consistent with Kalanke.2 68
In April 1996, following the Commission's plan for an
amendment of the Directive, the Parliament, at its public hearing
on equal opportunities, agreed that the issue needed to be
addressed at the IGC.2 6 9 An amendment to such a Directive,
however, would require unanimous consent of the Council of
2 70
Ministers.
As of December 1996, a rift remained among Council
members as to whether to amend the Directive. 2 7 1 Although
Spain and Italy supported the Commission's proposal, the
Council's Legal Service did not consider an amendment
necessary, but contended that a Commission Recommendation
would be a sufficient response to the Kalanke ruling. 2 72 This
suggestion, however, was discarded by Commissioner Flynn, who
continued to support a revision in the Directive. 2 73 Apparently,
the rift among Council members resulted because most Member
States did not believe an amendment was warranted, primarily
because the ECJ did not specifically invalidate the Directive in Its
74
rUling.

2

In April 1997, the Social Affairs Council convened to discuss,
among other issues, the Commission's 1996 draft proposal
clarifying the Directive, 27 5 however, the Social Affairs Ministers
shelved the proposal pending the conclusion of the IGC, to avoid
possible conflict with the provisions of the revised treaty. 2 76 Their

under-represented sex; and granting state subsidies to employers who recruit
women in sectors in which they are under-represented. Id.
268.
269.

Id.
Social Policy: Experts Callfor EU Treaty to Address Equal Opportunities,

EuR. REP., May 7, 1996, available in LEXIS, News Library, EURRPT File. Ulrike

Hauffe, the head of Bremen's Equal Opportunities Board, spoke at the hearing,
expressed her dissatisfaction with the Kalanke ruling and reiterated her support

for women's quota in the labor market. Id.
270.

Social Affairs Council" Employment and Social Security Dominate

December 2 Sitting, EuR. REP., Nov. 30, 1996, available in LEXIS, News Library,
EURRPT File.

271. Social Affairs Council: Broad Agreement on Burden of ProofDirective,
EuR. REP., Dec. 4, 1996, available in LEXIS, News Library, EURRPT File
(hereinafter BroadAgreement).

272.

Id.

273.

Recommendation on Equal Opportunities in Decison-Making Bodies,

EuR. Soc. POL'Y, Dec. 8, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, EURSOC File.
Commissioner Flynn contends that the revised Directive should permit positive
action programs that do not result in systematic favoring of one sex in hiring or
promotion. Id.
274.
275.

BroadAgreement, supranote 272.
EU: EU/Social Affairs - Major Topical Issues, Agence Europe, Apr. 17,

1997, availablein LEXIS, World Library, TXrLNE File.
276.

Id.
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reluctance to adopt the proposal may indicate that support for the
amendment is waning. In fact, only Spain, Ireland,
and Italy
277
continue to show strong support for the proposal.
The IGC, which concluded in June 1997, drafted the Treaty
of Amsterdam (hereinafter Draft Treaty), which is a modification
of the EU legal texts. 2 78 Although primarily focused on EU
enlargement and the implementation of the Economic Monetary
Union, the Draft Treaty does include provisions addressing
nondiscrimination and equality between men and women. 2 79 In
particular, the Draft Treaty includes a new article requiring the

Community to take appropriate action to combat discrimination
based on sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability,
age, or sexual orientation. 280 In reference to equality between men
and women, the drafters added paragraphs supplementing Title
II, Articles 2 and 3 of the Maastricht Treaty. Significantly, the
supplement to Article 3 reads, "In all activities referred to in this
Article, the Community shall aim to eliminate inequalities, and to
281
promote equality, between men and women."
The Draft Treaty will be finalized and ready for signature by
October 1997, after which Member States will begin ratification
proceedings. 2 82 Although the principles stated therein do not
conflict with the draft amendment to the Directive, the Social
Affairs Council will likely continue to delay its enactment because
Member States have failed to support the revision. The furor
Kalanke originally generated seems to have subsided.

VI. CONCLUSION

Although a revision of the Directive has been postponed, the
Kalanke decision provides a concise and simple standard with
which Member States should comply in formulating positive
action programs. Positive action programs that provide automatic

277.

Equal OpportunIties: Agreement On Burden Of Proof Directive In The

Offtng, EuR. REp., Apr. 16, 1997. availablein LEXIS, News Library, EURRPT File.
278.
European Council: Agreement On A New Treaty, EuRo-EAST, June 30,

1997, available in LEXIS, News Library, EUREAS File.
279.

Draft Treaty

of Amsterdam,

§

1

(visited

Oct.

7,

1997),

<http://www.bz mibuznl/engllsh/freatles/tradanhbml>.
280. Id. at art. 6(a).

281.

Id.at art. 3.

282. European Council, June 16/17, 1997: Summit Sees EU Stumble
Onwards In Amsterdam, EUR. REP.. June 18, 1997, available in LEXIS. News
Library, EURRPT File. The treaty should be signed by the Heads of State and
Government on October 1, 1997 in Amsterdam. Id. The treaty will then have to
be ratified by national parliaments as well as the European Parliament. If this
schedule is followed, the treaty should come into force on January 1, 1999. Id.
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preferences to one sex, even in areas where the candidates'
qualifications are equal, are discriminatory under Kalanke and
thus inconsistent with EU law. Succinctly, the Kalanke decision
holds that discrimination on the basis of sex is unlawful in the
EU. For many European citizens, particularly citizens of EU
Member States, however, this concept may not only be new but
contrary to many of their strongly embedded national laws.
Member States that oppose Kalanke will be confronted with a
dilemma that transcends national differences regarding the
desirability of positive action programs: that is, if Member States
insist on pursuing national social policies rather than adhering to

EU policy, they will undermine their political unity. Regardless of
their individual objections to Kalanke, the States must not
disregard it. Accession to the EU requires not only an acceptance
of EU laws, but also of EU interpretation of those laws. To protect
the underlying foundations of the EU, Member States must
concede some judicial independence. The concept of a "union"
implies not only solidarity but also compromise. Member States
must resist notions of secession in the face of conflict, but instead
respect the Union they joined and the precepts on which it is
based. Ultimately, the significance of the Kalanke decision may
not be its resolution of the positive action question, but the
willingness of Member States to abide by this opinion.
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